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1
 
Criminal Law and Procedure 
 
Summary 
 Appeal from a judgment of conviction by a criminal defendant convicted of indecent or 
obscene exposure.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
District court’s judgment reversed and remanded.  NRS 175.531 gives the district court 
some discretion in polling methods, but does not allow questioning of a dissenting juror. The 
district court’s questioning constituted plain error because it intruded into the exclusive province 
of the jury. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
The State charged David Saletta (“Saletta”) with indecent or obscene exposure. The State 
alleged that Saletta exposed his penis to a convenience store clerk from the parking lot.  Saletta 
claimed it was not intentional and that he was urinating.  The jury found Saletta guilty. 
 
 After the district court published the verdict, Saletta requested a jury poll. The first six 
jurors affirmed the verdict, the seventh juror dissented, and the rest of the jurors affirmed, 
resulting in a non-unanimous jury poll.  The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing and the 
dissenting juror was sworn in and examined by the State, Saletta, and the district court regarding 
“second thoughts,” deliberation time, coercion, when the vote changed, and whether further 
deliberation would change her mind.  Subsequently, the district court denied both the State’s 
motion to disqualify the dissenting juror and to use an alternate and Saletta’s motion for a 
mistrial.  The district court gave the jury additional instructions and ordered the jury to resume 
deliberation.  The jury again returned a guilty verdict, and the subsequent jury poll revealed the 
verdict was unanimous.   
 
Discussion 
Continuing the Poll 
 
Saletta claimed it was reversible error when the district court failed to stop the jury poll 
once the seventh juror made the poll non-unanimous.
2
  NRS 175.531 authorizes jury polling.  
Under the statute, when the poll results in a lack of unanimity, the trial court may direct the jury 
to continue deliberations or discharge the jury altogether. 
 
 NRS 175.531 is similar to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(d).  Like Rule 31(d), 
NRS 175.531 does not demand that jury polling must stop once a juror dissents and it does not 
constitute per se reversible error to continue polling.
3
  Reversible error is only found when the 
                                                          
1
 By Erin Elliott 
2
 Salletta relied on United States v. Spitz, 696 F.2d 916 (11th Cir. 1983). 
3
 The Eleventh Circuit used Rule 31(d) to conclude it does constitute reversible error, but five circuits used Rule 
31(d) to conclude it does not.  See Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177, 1182-85 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Gambino, 951 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 1988); Amos v. United 
States, 496 F.2d 1269, 1272-73 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brooks, 420 F.2d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
following factors demonstrate the method was coercive : 1) whether counsel objected to the 
polling, 2) whether the district court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury before excusing the 
jury for further deliberation, and 3) the amount of time that it took the jury to reach a verdict 
after deliberation resumed.
4
  Methods of jury polling are left to the discretion of the trial court 
and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
5
  
 
Here, the poll’s continuation was not coercive under the totality of the circumstances.  
First, Saletta did not object.  Second, the district court gave cautionary instruction when it told 
the jury to look at the instructions again before it began further deliberation.  Finally, the amount 
of time it took the jury to reach a verdict after resuming deliberations was not indicative of 
coercion because the jury deliberated longer than it had initially.   
 
Questioning the Dissenting Juror 
 
 Saletta claimed the district court should not have allowed the dissenting juror to be 
questioned during the evidentiary hearing because the questions constituted an undue intrusion 
into the exclusive deliberative province of the jury.  Under NRS 175.531, a court may address a 
non-unanimous jury poll by directing the jury to deliberate further or discharge the jury.  The 
statute does not authorize the court to ask dissenting jurors why they disagree.  Doing so 
constitutes “undue intrusion into the exclusive province of the jury” to reach a verdict and 
“exerts pressure on [the dissenting] juror to abandon his own view and conform his vote to the 
verdict as announced.”6  The questioning constitutes plain error because it is not permissible 
under NRS 175.531. Additionally, it affected Saletta’s substantial rights by depriving Saletta of 
his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the Petitioner’s contention that the district court’s 
polling method was coercive. However, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction and 
remanded for further proceedings because it was plain error for the district court to intrude into 
the jury’s exclusive province by questioning the dissenting juror. 
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 United States v. Nelson, 692 F.2d 83, 85 (9th Cir. 1982). 
